In a breakthrough development, Northern District of Georgia federal district judge Leigh Martin May found that Charles Hill, a respondent in a pending SEC administrative proceeding, had a “substantial likelihood of success” of showing that the proceeding against him is unconstitutional because the appointment of the administrative law judge presiding over his case violated the appointments clause of Article II of the Constitution. That is one of several arguments that have been made against the legality of the SEC’s administrative enforcement proceedings, and this is the first court to treat any of those arguments seriously.
Judge May’s decision is here: Order in Hill v. SEC.
Judge Leigh May. Photo by John Disney/Daily Report.
The opinion, while tempered, is an eye-opener for the SEC, which has so far convinced other courts (and no doubt themselves) either not to consider these arguments or give them short shrift. The Commission now has no choice but to reconsider whether its recent determination to shift important enforcement cases from federal courts to its administrative courts still makes sense. One can assume there will be every effort to appeal this decision and get this decision overturned on an expedited basis, but that could take months, even in an accelerated proceeding, and the Eleventh Circuit might end up agreeing with Judge May. The availability of a stay pending appeal may be in doubt because the order only halts the one proceeding against Mr. Hill, making the need for a stay questionable. Alternatively, the Commission could expedite its own consideration of this issue in the pending Timbervest administrative proceeding (see SEC Broadens Constitutional Inquiry into Its Own Administrative Judges in Timbervest Case), rule in its own favor, and possibly get the issue to an appellate court with an added argument that the SEC’s decision is entitled to some deference. Since Timbervest is located in Atlanta, that may also end up before the Eleventh Circuit. In the meantime, there is a cloud over the entire SEC administrative enforcement process, although, as noted, Judge May’s order itself only halts the impending adminsitrative trial of Mr. Hill.
Judge May’s opinion was careful and thorough. In the end, it came down to a single issue: whether the SEC’s administrative law judges are “executive officers” subject to the appointments clause and other Article II limits on diminishing executive power. Some time ago, we wrote that this was a serious issue on which Supreme Court precedent seemed likely create problems for the SEC. See Challenges to the Constitutionality of SEC Administrative Proceedings in Peixoto and Stilwell May Have Merit. Until now, however, no court has been willing to give the argument thorough consideration. See In Duka v. SEC, SDNY Judge Berman Finds SEC Administrative Law Enforcement Proceedings Constitutional in a Less than Compelling Opinion.
The opinion begins with a discussion of many of the respects in which “SEC administrative proceedings vary greatly from federal court actions.” Slip op. at 4. These include: the rules of evidence do not apply; respondents “are generally barred from taking depositions”; “SEC administrative proceedings also occur much more quickly than federal court actions”; “[c]ounterclaims are not permissible”; there is no equivalent of Rule 12(b) motions “to test the allegations sufficiency”; and “there is no right to a jury trial.” Id. at 4-5.
It then discusses the respective powers of the ALJ and the SEC: the presiding ALJ is selected by the chief ALJ, presides over the matter and issues an initial decision; the SEC may order interlocutory review of any ALJ decision during the proceeding; the initial decision can be appealed by either party or reviewed by the SEC on its own initiative; a decision is not final until the SEC issues it, but if there is no appeal and the SEC does not review an ALJ decision “it is deemed the action of the Commission,” and the SEC issues an order making that decision final; SEC review is de novo and new evidence can be heard, but “the SEC will accept the ALJ’s ‘credibility finding, absent overwhelming evidence to the contrary.’” An SEC decision can be appealed to a federal court of appeals (either the D.C. Circuit or the Circuit where the respondent resides). On appeal, the “SEC’s findings of facts are ‘conclusive’ ‘if supported by substantial evidence.’” Id. at 5-7.
The court then describes that SEC ALJs “are ‘not appointed by the President, the Courts, or the [SEC] Commissioners. Instead, they are hired by the SEC’s Office of Administrative Law Judges, with input from the Chief Administrative Law Judge, human resource functions, and the Office of Personnel Management.’” Id. at 7. Congress authorized the SEC to delegate any of its functions to an ALJ, and the SEC promulgated regulations making ALJs responsible for the “fair and orderly conduct” of proceedings and giving them the authority to: “(1) Administer oaths and affirmations; (2) Issue subpoenas; (3) Rule on offers of proof; (4) Examine witnesses; (5) Regulate the course of a hearing; (6) Hold pre-hearing conferences; (7) Rule upon motions; and (8) Unless waived by the parties, prepare an initial decision containing the conclusions as to the factual and legal issues presented, and issue an appropriate order.” Id. at 8.
The court then moved to the specifics of Mr. Hill’s prosecution, noting that he moved for summary disposition on constitutionality grounds but that ALJ James Grimes ruled that he lacked the authority to address two of the three grounds asserted: that “Congess’s delegation of authority to the SEC to pursue cases before ALJs violates the delegation doctrine in Article I of the Constitution,” and that “Congress violated his Seventh Amendment right to jury trial by allowing the SEC to pursue charges in an administrative proceeding.” Id. at 10. See SEC ALJ Says He Lacks Authority To Decide Key Constitutional Challenges. Mr. Hill sought relief from the federal court to prevent the proceeding on these constitutionality grounds, and later amended his complaint to assert that the proceeding was also unconstitutional because “the SEC ALJ’s appointment violated the Appointments Clause of Article II as the ALJ is allegedly an inferior officer and he was not appointed by the President, the courts of law, or a department head.” Slip op. at 10-11.
Turning to the legal determinations, Judge May first rejected the SEC’s contention that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. The SEC made this argument successfully in cases previously brought by other respondents, including Wing Chau and Laurie Bebo. See SEC Wins First Skirmish on Constitutional Challenge to Chau Administrative Proceeding; Court Dismisses “Compelling and Meritorious” Bebo Constitutional Claims Solely on Jurisdictional Grounds. The SEC argued “that its election to pursue claims against Plaintiff in an administrative proceeding, ‘channels review of Plaintiff’s claims through the Commission’s administrative process, with review in the courts of appeals,’” that is, “judicial review can only come from the courts of appeal following the administrative proceeding and the SEC’s issuance of a final order in Plaintiff’s case.” Slip op. at 11-12. The court found this “in tension with 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides that federal district courts ‘have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,’ and 28 U.S.C. § 2201, which authorizes declaratory judgments.” Id. at 12. The court rejected the SEC’s argument that “Congress declared its intent for the administrative proceeding to be the exclusive forum for judicial review for these cases by allowing the SEC to make the administrative proceeding its forum choice,” finding instead that “Congress’s purposeful language allowing both district court and administrative proceedings shows a different intent. Instead, the clear language of the statute provides a choice of forum, and there is no language indicating that the administrative proceeding was to be an exclusive forum.” Id. at 13.
Moving beyond this point to the issue addressed previously by two other courts in the SEC’s favor – whether Supreme Court precedent on the issue supports a finding that Congress did withdraw jurisdiction – Judge May found otherwise because:
(1) “If Plaintiff is required to raise his constitutional law claims following the administrative proceeding, he will be forced to endure what he contends is an unconstitutional process.” Slip op. at 15. Critically, Mr. Hill “does not challenge the SEC’s conduct in that proceeding or the allegations against him—he challenges the proceeding itself” (id. at 17). “Waiting until the harm Plaintiff alleges cannot be remedied is not meaningful judicial review.” Id. at 18.
(2) The constitutional challenge is “wholly collateral” to the merits of the proceeding itself. “Plaintiff is not challenging an agency decision; Plaintiff is challenging whether the SEC’s ability to make that decision was constitutional. What occurs at the administrative proceeding and the SEC’s conduct there is irrelevant to this proceeding which seeks to invalidate the entire statutory scheme.” Id. at 20.
(3) The constitutional issues are outside the SEC’s expertise. “Plaintiff’s constitutional claims are governed by Supreme Court jurisprudence, and ‘the statutory questions involved do not require technical considerations of agency policy.’” Id. at 21.
This aspect of the opinion is consistent with Judge Richard Berman’s decision in Duka v. SEC (SDNY). Judge Berman, however, went on to reject Ms. Duka’s constitutional argument, finding the she was “unlikely to succeed on the merits” of that claim.
Having likewise found her court had jurisdiction over Mr. Hill’s claim, however, Judge May went in a different direction on the merits of the preliminary injunction sought by Mr. Hill. The critical issue was whether Mr. Hill had “a substantial likelihood to succeed on the merits” on his constitutional claims.
Judge May found no such likelihood of success for the argument that the power given to the SEC in the Dodd-Frank Act to bring these cases in its administrative court was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Instead, she found this authority was a form of prosecutorial discretion that is an executive power, not a delegated legislative power. “When the SEC makes its forum selection decision, it is acting under executive authority and exercising prosecutorial discretion. . . . Because Congress has properly delegated power to the executive branch to make the forum choice for the underlying SEC enforcement action, the Court finds that the Plaintiff cannot prove a substantial likelihood of success on the merits on his non-delegation claim.” Slip op. at 23-29.
On the Seventh Amendment jury trial issue, the court likewise found no substantial likelihood of success. Judge May found Supreme Court precedent on this controlling because SEC prosecutions involve “public rights,” since the SEC “is acting as a sovereign in the performance of its executive duties when it pursues an enforcement action.” The controlling Supreme Court case, Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977), rejected the jury trial argument in administrative enforcement actions brought by OSHA.
One might question whether this addresses the true jury trial issue in SEC cases. Unlike the OSHA case, the SEC traditionally prosecuted alleged violations of the securities laws by unregulated persons in federal court actions, in which there is a jury trial right as to non-equitable claims. Only after Dodd-Frank was enacted was the SEC permitted to commence the same actions in its administrative courts. That means the SEC was given the power to deny a defendant what for many years has been a jury trial right, and, because there are no standards governing how to go about doing this, currently does so without any enforceable or predictable guidelines for the decision. That raises a combination of jury trial, equal protection, and arbitrary and capriciousness arguments that the Atlas Roofing case does not begin to address. I expect a more definitive consideration of the jury trial issue is yet to come.
Judge May did ultimately find a substantial likelihood of success on one of Mr. Hill’s constitutional arguments, which raises the question of whether it was prudent to decide these first two constitutional issues when they did not, in the end, have a bearing on her decision. Normally, a court strives to avoid constitutional issues if possible.
But the blockbuster part of the opinion is certainly the discussion of the alleged Article II violations. Judge May did find a substantial likelihood of success on at least one of Mr. Hill’s alleged violations of Article II – whether the appointment of ALJ Grimes violated the appointments clause in Article II, section 2, clause 2. (Having reached that conclusion, she found it unnecessary to decide the other Article II issue – whether the double layer of tenure protection for SEC ALJs unacceptably encroached on the President’s executive power. Why was that given different treatment than the delegation and jury trial issues?)
The threshold question for each of these arguments was whether SEC ALJs are “executive officers” within the meaning of Article II. We previously discussed this issue at length (in the aforementioned Challenges to the Constitutionality of SEC Administrative Proceedings in Peixoto and Stilwell May Have Merit), and expressed the view that Supreme Court precedent in Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991), strongly suggested that the SEC ALJs were, indeed, “inferior officers” within the meaning of Article II. Judge May agreed that Freytag was effectively controlling, as follows:
The issue of whether the SEC ALJ is an inferior officer or employee for purposes of the Appointments Clause depends on the authority he has in conducting administrative proceedings. . . . The Appointments Clause . . . creates two classes of officers: principal officers, who are selected by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, and inferior officers, whom “Congress may allow to be appointed by the President alone, by the heads of departments, or by the Judiciary.” . . . The Appointments Clause applies to all agency officers including those whose functions are “predominately quasi judicial and quasi legislative” and regardless of whether the agency officers are “independent of the Executive in their day-to-day operations.” . . .
“[A]ny appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an ‘Officer of the United States,’ and must, therefore, be appointed in the manner prescribed by § 2, cl. 2, of [Article II].” . . . By way of example, the Supreme “Court has held that district-court clerks, thousands of clerks within the Treasury and Interior Departments, an assistant surgeon, a cadet-engineer, election monitors, federal marshals, military judges, Article I [Tax Court special trial] judges, and the general counsel for the Transportation Department are inferior officers.” . . .
Plaintiff claims that SEC ALJs are inferior officers because they exercise “significant authority pursuant to the laws of the Unites States” while the SEC contends ALJs are “mere employees” based upon Congress’s treatment of them and the fact that they cannot issue final orders and do not have contempt power. . . . The Court finds that based upon the Supreme Court’s holding in Freytag, SEC ALJs are inferior officers.
In Freytag, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether special trial judges (“STJ”) in the Tax Court were inferior officers under Article II. . . . The Government argued, much as the SEC does here, that STJs do “no more than assist the Tax Court judge in taking the evidence and preparing the proposed findings and opinion,” id., and they “lack authority to enter a final decision.” . . . The Supreme Court rejected that argument. . . .
The Court finds that like the STJs in Freytag, SEC ALJs exercise “significant authority.” The office of an SEC ALJ is established by law, and the “duties, salary, and means of appointment for that office are specified by statute.” . . . ALJs are permanent employees—unlike special masters—and they take testimony, conduct trial, rule on the admissibility of evidence, and can issue sanctions, up to and including excluding people (including attorneys) from hearings and entering default. . . .
Slip op. at 35-38 (citations omitted).
Judge May went on to consider the divided decision of a D.C. Circuit panel in Landry v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 204 F.3d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2000), that ALJs at the FDIC were not executive officers. She was convinced that the concurring minority opinion in that case was more true to Freytag than the majority of the panel, and, like the concurring judge in Landry, concluded “that the Supreme Court in Freytag found that the STJs powers—which are nearly identical to the SEC ALJs here—were independently sufficient to find that STJs were inferior officers.” Slip op. at 40.
Judge May also rejected the SEC’s argument that the court “should defer to Congress’s apparent determination that ALJs are inferior officers” because “Congress is presumed to know about the Appointments Clause, and it decided to have ALJs appointed through OPM and subject to the civil service system,” and therefore “intended for ALJs to be employees.” Id. at 41. Because the appointments clause “prevents Congress from dispensing power too freely,” Judge May found that argument unacceptable: “Congress may not ‘decide’ an ALJ is an employee, but then give him the powers of an inferior officer; that would defeat the separation-of-powers protections the Clause was enacted to protect.” Accordingly, the court found “that SEC ALJs are inferior officers.” Id. Moreover, because the SEC “concedes that Plaintiff’s ALJ, James E. Grimes, was not appointed by an SEC Commissioner,” he “was not appointed by the President, a department head, or the Judiciary” as the appointments clause requires.” As a result, “[b]ecause he was not appropriately appointed pursuant to Article II, his appointment is likely unconstitutional in violation of the Appointments Clause.” Id. at 42.
We might add that by all appearances ALJ Grimes’s treatment of the constitutional challenges to the proceeding before him has been handled responsibly, even to the point of granting a subpoena on the SEC sought by Mr. Hill relating to a due process challenge on the basis of possible systemic bias in the administrative court. See SEC ALJ James Grimes Issues Important Discovery Order Against SEC.
Judge May went on to find the other requirements for a preliminary injunction satisfied (id. at 42-43), and ruled that “a preliminary injunction is appropriate to enjoin the SEC administrative proceeding and to allow the Court sufficient time to consider this matter on the merits.” Id. at 44.
The judge’s final words addressed whether all of this was important enough to support potentially debilitating relief (and least in the short term):
The Court notes that this conclusion may seem unduly technical, as the ALJ’s appointment could easily be cured by having the SEC Commissioners issue an appointment or preside over the matter themselves. However, the Supreme Court has stressed that the Appointments Clause guards Congressional encroachment on the Executive and “preserves the Constitution’s structural integrity by preventing the diffusion of appointment power.” Freytag, 501 U.S. at 878. This issue is “neither frivolous or disingenuous.” Id. at 879. The Article II Appointments Clause is contained in the text of the Constitution and is an important part of the Constitution’s separation of powers framework.
In addition, the Appointments Clause may not be waived, not even by the Executive. Id. at 880 (“Neither Congress nor the Executive can agree to waive this structural protection.”). As this likely Appointment Clause violation “goes to the validity of the [administrative] proceeding that is the basis for this litigation,” id. at 879, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant, the Securities and Exchange Commission, is preliminarily enjoined from conducting the administrative proceeding brought against Plaintiff . . . including the hearing scheduled for June 15, 2015, before an Administrative Law Judge who has not been appointed by the head of the Department.
Slip op. at 44.
The SEC is likely unprepared for this occurrence. But, as we previously wrote, the case law strongly supported the view that SEC ALJs are, indeed, inferior executive officers, and serious constitutional issues flow from that, including the appointments clause issue now decided against the SEC.
As the court notes, there may be some tweaks that could clear up this issue, although they may well require action by Congress amending the statutory provisions governing the appointment of administrative law judges (an issue I’ve not looked at). But even if a “cure” is possible with such tweaks, they would not address the more fundamental question of whether the SEC is doing the right thing by bringing serious prosecutorial actions like these against persons not subject to SEC regulatory oversight in the administrative court. The lengthy list given by Judge May of the respects in which respondents are impeded from presenting a defense in the administrative forum, as compared to federal courts, should give a fair-minded Commission pause about whether its recent policy of increased administrative enforcement actions needs to be reconsidered. See Former SEC Enforcement Leaders Urge SEC To Reform Administrative Enforcement Process. The bottom line is that when unregulated persons are prosecuted for alleged violations and face debilitating demands for penalties and purported “disgorgement,” plus the usual SEC effort to bar these people from future employment as officers or directors of public companies, perhaps the “right” thing to do is allow them to defend themselves in a forum that provides a more level playing field. Is it really that hard to “do the right thing”?
June 9, 2015
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